By many of those who hold the first of these theories, the Lord’s day is made a purely ecclesiastical institution, without any other warrant for its observance than the action of the church, by whose authority and in whose wisdom, the day is set apart for divine service. By others who accept the same general theory, apostolic authority in the early church is admitted to afford a divine warrant for the observance of the day. In a complete treatise on the Lord’s day, a careful discussion of this theory would be required. Its want of any sufficient foundation could be satisfactorily shown by a presentation of the following points: (1.) The declaration of the Lord of the Sabbath is explicit—“The Sabbath was made for man.” It was not made for any portion of the human family, but for the race of mankind. (2.) Thus, from the design of its Lord, and the very nature of the institution, the Sabbath cannot be limited to any locality or dispensation. (3.) Accordingly, it was given to man at his creation. (Gen. 3:3.) (4.) For the same reason, the law of the Sabbath has its proper place, not among ceremonial, local, or positive enactments, but among the immutable moral precepts of the decalogue. (5.) This law is, therefore, of universal and perpetual obligation upon our race. These points would give room for many articles; but, inasmuch as on all of them there is entire agreement between our seventh-day Sabbatarian friends and ourselves, we pass to a consideration of the second theory, which they accept as correct. To make good their case, the advocates of the second theory must show that the seventh day continued to be the Sabbath observed by the church after the resurrection of Christ, just as before; and that, in the observance of the first day, a great departure took place from the original practice of the Christian church. They must not make _bare_ statements, but they must furnish proof. Instead of appealing to the letter of the law, and insisting that fact must conform to their interpretation of it, they must accept the facts of history, and put their interpretations to the test. It is more reasonable to conclude that an interpretation of law is wrong, than to reject the attested facts of history, when the interpretation and the facts do not harmonize.