because the iron-willed Czar had carried matters in Europe with a very high hand, and was, in fact, virtually master of the Old World, and suspected of being on uncommonly good terms with the masters of the New World. Nicholas had succeeded to the place of Napoleon in their ill graces. They liked the Cossackry of the one as little as they had liked the cannonarchy of the other. It was a case of pure jealousy. Russia was too powerful to suit the English idea of the fitness of things, and therefore it was necessary that she should be chastised and humbled. Fear of Russia there could have been none in the English mind. It has been thought that England contended for the safety of her Eastern dominions; but then the Czar offered her Egypt and Candia, possession of which would not only have much strengthened her Indian empire, but have been the means of making her more powerful at home. Nothing better could have been offered for her acceptance, if valuable territories would have satisfied her feelings; and much praise has been bestowed upon her because she did not close with the Czar's proposition 'to share and share alike' the lands of the House of Othman; but that praise is not quite deserved, the desire not to see Russia aggrandized being a stronger sentiment with her than was the desire to aggrandize herself. Had the question been left for British statesmen alone to settle,--had the British premier been as free to act for England as the Czar was for Russia,--poor, sick Turkey would have been cut and carved most expeditiously and artistically; she would have been partitioned as perfectly as Poland, and Abdul Medjid would have experienced the fate of Stanislaus Poniatowski. But English ministers hold power only on condition of doing the will of the English nation, and that nation had contracted an aversion to Russia that was uncontrollable, and before its hostility its ministers had to give way, slowly and reluctantly; and the half-measures they adopted, like the half-measures of our own government toward the secessionists, explain the disasters of the war. The English people were determined that there should be an end, for the time at least, to the Russian hegemony, and threw themselves into the arms of France with a vivacity that would have astonished any other French ruler but Napoleon III., who had lived among them, and who knew them well. The war was waged, and, when over, what had England gained? Nothing solid, it must be admitted. The territory of Russia remained unimpaired, and there is not the slightest evidence that her influence in the East was lessened by the partial destruction of Sebastopol. The Russian navy of the Euxine had ceased to exist; but as it consisted principally of vessels that were not adapted to the purposes of modern warfare, the loss of the Russians in that respect was not of a very serious character. Russia's European leadership was suspended; but her power and