her resources, which, if properly employed, must soon reinstate her, were not damaged. England _had_ fought for an idea, and had fought in vain. France had as little interest in the Russian war as England, and the French people had no wish to fight the Czar. They would have preferred fighting the English, in connection with the Czar,--an arrangement that would have been more profitable to their country. But the emperor had a quarrel with his arrogant brother at St. Petersburgh, and he availed himself of the opportunity afforded by that brother's obstinacy to teach him a lesson from which he did not live to profit. Nicholas had cut the new emperor, and had caused him to be taboo'd by most of the sovereigns of Europe; and the Frenchman determined to cut his way to consideration. This he was enabled to do, with the aid of the English; and ever since the war's close he has held the place which became vacant on the death of Nicholas--that of Europe's arbiter. The French fought well, as they always do, but their heart was not in the war. The emperor had the war party pretty much to himself. Exactly the opposite state of things existed in France to that which existed in England. In the former country, the government was for war, and the people were for peace; in the latter, the government was for peace, and the people were for war. In each country power was in the hands of the war party, and so war was made, in spite of the wishes of the French people and of English statesmen. When Napoleon III. had accomplished _his_ purpose, he ordered the English to make peace, and peace was made. In this way he satisfied his subjects, showing them that he had no intention of making England more powerful than she had been, or Russia weaker. He had prevented Russia from extending her dominion, but he had also prevented England from lessening that dominion.