produces these evils, although depreciation adds to the disaster. What is the effect here of a redundant currency, is ascertained by reference to our exports. By Treasury Tables 20 and 21, our foreign imports consumed here in 1836-'7 rose to $168,233,675, being largely more than double what they were in 1832 ($76,989,793), and nearly double the consumption, _per capita_, which was $5.61 in 1832, and $10.93 in 1836. This was our great year of a redundant, although still a convertible currency, when our imports consumed exceeded our exports of domestic produce, $61,662,733; and so enhanced was the cost of living and production here, that we actually imported breadstuffs that year of the value of $5,271,576. (Table 1, Com. and Nav.) Our bank currency that year was as follows: Circulation, $149,185,890; deposits, $127,397,185; circulation and deposits, $276,583,075; loans, $525,115,702. (Treasury Report, 1838, Doc. 79, tables K. K.) The legitimate result of this expansion of loans and currency was the great bank suspension of May, 1837, and general bankruptcy throughout the country. Now our bank circulation in 1860 was $207,102,477; deposits, $253,802,129; circulation and deposits, $460,904,606; loans, $691,495,580. (Table 34, Census of 1860.) Yet our population in 1860 was more than double that of 1837, and our wealth (the true barometer, marking the proper rise and fall of our currency) had much more than quadrupled. (Census Table 35.) The proportion of the currency to wealth in 1837 was more than double the ratio of 1860. It was not the tariff that produced the suspension of 1837, for it was _much lower_ in 1860, than at the date of the bank suspension of 1837.