But, in the second place, suppose it were possible to have a 'cessation of hostilities' without this preliminary acknowledgment of the Confederate independence, and that the war might be at an absolute stand still for a definite season, are we fully aware of the risks attending this measure? For the Chicago platform has left them out of sight. 'A cessation of hostilities' is an armistice; and there is no such thing known in the authorities on international law, or in history, as 'a cessation of hostilities' distinct from an armistice. In defining the incidents of war, Wheaton speaks of a '_suspension of hostilities by means of a truce_, or _armistice_,' and uses the three terms interchangeably. In other words, whatever 'cessation (or suspension, as it is called in the books) of hostilities,' there may occur between the parties to a war, it is known among men and in history as an armistice, which is also the technical term for it. There would be no need to enlarge upon this point, if it had not been made already the basis of fallacious appeals to popular ignorance. Now, the incidents of an armistice are well defined, giving to both parties, besides the advantage of time to rest, full liberty to repair damages and make up losses of men and material; and it is perfect folly, or worse, to talk of 'a cessation of hostilities' without giving to the rebels these important advantages. But the controlling consideration in reference to this whole thing, and which every person ought to ponder carefully, is the effect of the proposed 'cessation of hostilities' upon our neutral neighbors. On this point the doctrine of international law is thus stated by the distinguished French writer, Hautefeuille, 'the eminent advocate of neutral rights,' as he is justly called by the American editor of Wheaton, and whose works on neutral relations are always cited with respect, and recognized as authority. 'The duties imposed on neutrals by the state of war belong essentially to the state of war itself. From the moment it ceases, for whatever cause, even temporarily, the duties of neutrals likewise cease; _as to them, peace is completely restored during the suspension of arms_. They resume then all the rights which had been modified by the war, and can exercise them in their full extent during the whole time fixed for the duration of the truce, if this time has been limited by the agreement; and until the resumption of hostilities has been officially announced to them, if it has not been limited.'[5] [Footnote 5: 'Des Droits des Nations Neutres,' t. I., p. 301]