Lord Elgin returned to England, and Mr. Bruce was appointed his successor. It was at first announced that he had been furnished with ambassadorial powers, but as such powers would have entitled him to demand a personal reception by the emperor, it was, on reconsideration, very judiciously thought better to avoid a question which might lead to great embarrassments, and he was accredited as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Peking court. To our judgment it appears the instructions of Lord Malmesbury were too peremptory as to the course Mr. Bruce was to pursue; and if that course was to be insisted on, most inadequate means were provided.[20] It is but another example of those in the distance imagining they see more clearly than those who are near, and assuming an acquaintance with local circumstances--subject every hour to change--which, without the attributes of omnipresence and omniscience, it is impossible they should possess. Whatever may have been the views of the Cabinet at home, it is obvious that the forces which accompanied Mr. Bruce were as superfluous for peace as they were insufficient for war, and that he was placed in the embarrassing dilemma either of disobeying his orders, or of incurring great risk in the attempt to execute them. That the Admiral singularly overrated his own force, and under-estimated that of the Chinese, admits now of no controversy. But an indulgent judgment should be awarded to one so personally brave and self-sacrificing, and who was entitled to confide in the indomitable bravery of those he commanded; whose experience, too, of the general character of Chinese warfare was not likely to teach them prudence or caution. The first and the most natural inquiry is, what is likely to be the result of these disastrous events? If negotiations are wisely conducted, the probability is that the emperor will throw the blame on the local authorities, attribute to the misrepresentations which have been made any approval he may have given to those who attacked the Allies, and repudiate any intended complicity in the mismanagement of foreign relations. For it has hitherto been the invariable policy of the Chinese government to localize every quarrel, and to avoid any general war. There is no scruple about sacrificing any mandarin whose proceedings, though lauded and recompensed at first, have in the sequel proved injudicious or injurious.