The Creator, and what we may know of the method of creationDallinger, W. H. (William Henry)
Religion
The Creator, and what we may know of the method of creation
Dallinger, W. H. (William Henry)
Creation; Evolution; God; Religion and science
Then, in all the area of the universe as we know it, that is, within
the range of our experience and experiment, infinite vicissitude leaves
what we know as an elementary body, with its first qualities intact,
neither more nor less. But we must transcend experience, disregard the
evidence before us, and _believe_ that if we give the primal atoms with
their inalienable motion _time enough_, they will emerge at last, not
only as life, but as intellect!
Can it avail to repudiate materialism, and yet to philosophically
conjure mind out of matter? We must indeed recast our definition of
matter to do this; but how? Says Professor Max Müller: ‘Mill declares
in one place (_Logic_ v. 3, 3) that it is a mere fallacy to say that
matter cannot think. Here again he ought to define first of all what
he means by matter, and according to his definition it may or may not
be a fallacy to say that matter cannot think. If we say that matter
cannot think, we do not say so because we cannot conceive thought to be
annexed to any arrangement of material particles ... the reason why
we are justified in saying “matter cannot think” is our having in our
language and thought separated matter from thought, our having called
and conceived what is without thought matter, and what is without
matter thought. Having done this, we are as certain that our matter
cannot think as that A=A and not =B.‘[30]
[Footnote 30: _The Science of Thought_, p. 616.]
The verdict of consciousness is the immovable base of all mental
action. Our consciousness affirms our personality and insists on our
identity. The Ego is conscious of itself as the hidden thread of unity
on which are strung all the past and present states of consciousness
and thought. Separate ‘states of consciousness’ as affections of matter
we have seen are impossible. But even if they could exist, _to_ whom
is their existence? A pang of unutterable remorse, a thrill of keenest
pleasure, do not feel themselves. I feel them; what is that I, to whom
the feeling is? It is always there, and in the language of Spencer
already quoted ‘is the unknown permanent _nexus_ which is never itself
a state of consciousness, but which holds all states of consciousness
together.’ Then it is as real and more absolute than the ‘states of
consciousness’ themselves.
The personal pronouns are as plentiful in the language of modern
materialists as in the language of sentiment or theology. What do they
represent?
Looking back and looking forward, thinking of ‘what might have been’
and anticipating what will be; and being absolutely conscious that
it is ‘I’ in unchanged and unchanging identity that am looking back
upon myself, and looking forward to myself, is unthinkable, unless
_something_ to which all successive states of consciousness have been,
are, and shall be, is admitted. If I deny the separate existence of the
Ego, I to all intents and purposes deny that I am, and yet it is I that
am there, perjuring myself by the denial.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account