The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of AnimalsEvans, E. P. (Edward Payson)
History
The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals
Evans, E. P. (Edward Payson)
Animals -- Law and legislation -- History; Animals, Prosecution and punishment of -- History; Trials -- Europe
A point of practical importance, which the criminal anthropologist has to
consider is the relation of moral to penal responsibility. If there is no
freedom of the will and the commission of crime is the necessary result of
physiological idiosyncrasies, hereditary predispositions, brachycephalous,
dolichocephalous or microcephalous peculiarities, anomalies of cerebral
convolution, or other anatomical asymmetries, over which the individual
has no control and by which his destiny is determined, then he is
certainly not morally responsible for his conduct. But is he on this
account to be exempt from punishment? The vast majority of criminalists
answer this question unhesitatingly in the negative, declaring that penal
legislation is independent of metaphysical opinion, and that punishment is
proper and imperative so far as it is essential to the protection and
preservation of society. If the infliction of the penalties depriving a
man of his freedom or his life is found to secure these ends, it is the
duty of the tribunals established for the administration of justice to
impose them without troubling themselves about the mental condition of the
culprit or stopping to discuss problems which belong to the province of
the psychiater. Legal tribunals are not offices in which candidates for
the insane asylum are examined or certificates of admission to
reformatories issued, but are organized as a terror to evil-doers in the
general interests of society, and all their decisions should have this
object in view. If a madman is not hanged for murder, it is solely because
such a procedure would exert no deterring influence upon other madmen;
society protects itself, in cases of this kind, by depriving the dangerous
individual of his liberty and thus preventing him from doing harm; but it
has no right to inflict upon him wanton and superfluous suffering. Even if
it should be deemed desirable to kill him, the method of his removal
should be such as to cause the least possible pain and publicity. Here,
too, the welfare of society is the determinative factor.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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