former times the animal was not punished capitally because it was supposed to have incurred guilt, but as a memorial of the occurrence, or in the language of canonical law: _Non propter culpam sed propter memoriam facti pecus occiditur_. It was put to death not because it was culpable, but because it was harmful; and this is the ground on which the radical wing of criminal anthropologists would repress and eliminate a vicious person without regard to his mental soundness or moral responsibility; to use Garofalo’s metaphor he is a microbe injurious to the social organism and must be destroyed. Lombroso carries his theory of the innateness, hereditability and ineradicableness of criminal propensities so far as to affirm that “education cannot change those who are born with perverse instincts,” and to despair of correcting an obstinate bias of this sort even in a child. In accordance with this idea his disciple, Le Bon, proposes to “deport to distant countries all professional criminals or persistent relapsers into vice (_récidivistes_) together with their posterity,” and would thus practically revive the barbarous principle of visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children, although he does not regard their conduct as sinful in the sense of being a voluntary transgression of the moral law, but as the result of a transmitted taint and organic deficiency, for which the individual is in no wise responsible. It is hardly necessary to add that this doctrine is not sustained by the statistics of reformatories, houses of refuge and similar institutions, which have now taken the place of the prison and the scaffold in the case of juvenile offenders.