The Crisis of Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One in the Government of the United States.: Its Cause, and How It Should Be MetStreight, Abel D.
History
The Crisis of Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One in the Government of the United States.: Its Cause, and How It Should Be Met
Streight, Abel D.
Secession; United States -- Politics and government -- 1857-1861
"When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the
standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of
almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, N. Carolina, nor Georgia, can by any means be
compared with the models from which he reasoned, and to which the
terms of his description apply. If we therefore receive his ideas on
this point, as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the
alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy,
or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous,
clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of
unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or
contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on the other side
of the question, seem to have been aware of the dilemma, and have even
been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a
desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate
expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the
views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence
beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue; but it could never
promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.
"Referring the examination of the principle itself to an other place,
as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here,
that in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted
upon the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of
the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union; but would not militate
against their being all comprehended in one confederate government.
And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at
present interested.
"So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition
to a general union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a
CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, as the expedient for extending the sphere of
popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with
those of republicanism.
"'It is very probable, says he,[1] that mankind would have been
obliged, at length, to live constantly under the government of a
SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution, that has
all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the
external force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE
REPUBLIC.
"'This form of government is a convention, by which several smaller
_States_ agree to become members of a larger _one_, which they intend
to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a
new one, capable of increasing by means of new associations, till they
arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the
security of the united body.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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