The Crisis of the Naval WarJellicoe, John Rushworth
History
The Crisis of the Naval War
Jellicoe, John Rushworth
World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations, British
Under the old organization it had been the custom during the war for the
Third Sea Lord to give to the Board and to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Grand Fleet a personal forecast of the anticipated dates of completion
of all warships under construction. My experience whilst in command of
the Grand Fleet had been that this personal forecast was generally
fairly accurate for six months ahead.
As an example it may be stated that in the first four months of 1917 the
delivery of destroyers _was within one of the forecast_ made in October,
1916, four vessels of the class being slightly behind and three ahead of
the forecast. Of thirteen "E" class submarines forecasted in October,
1916, for delivery by March, 1917, all except two were delivered by
April; of twelve "K" class submarines forecasted for delivery in the
same period, all except three were delivered by April, 1917. It should
be stated that these "K" class submarines were vessels of a new type,
involving new problems of some difficulty.
On the other hand there was considerable delay in the completion of a
number of the thirty "P" boats forecasted in October, 1916, for delivery
during the first seven months of 1917, and the April forecast showed
that only twenty out of the thirty would be delivered during that
period. There was also some delay in the delivery of twin screw
minesweepers, twenty of which were shown in the forecast of October,
1916, as due for delivery in the first six months of 1917. The April,
1917, forecast showed that six had been delivered or would complete in
April, ten more would complete within the estimated period, and the four
remaining would be overdue and would not be delivered until July or
August.
These figures show the degree of reliance which could be placed on the
personal forecasts of the Third Sea Lord under the old organization. It
is, of course, a fact that accurate forecasts do not _necessarily_ mean
that the rate of production is satisfactory, but only that the forecast
is to be depended on. We were never at all satisfied with the rate of
production, either under the old or the new organization. Accuracy of
forecast was, however, of great use from the Staff point of view in
allotting new ships to the various commands and in planning operations.
To turn now to the figures given by the Admiralty Controller under the
new organization. The table below shows the forecasts ("F") given in
June, 1917, and the deliveries ("D") of different classes of warships
month by month during the period of July to November of that year:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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