-------------------------------------------------------------------- Class of | July. | Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Deficit in Vessel. | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | 5 months -------------------------------------------------------------------- Flotilla | | | | | | | | | | | Leaders | | | | | | | | | | | and T.B.D's.| 5 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 4 Submarines | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 11 Sloops | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 5 "P." Boats | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Amongst vessels which were classed as auxiliaries the figures were: Class of | July. | Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Deficit in Vessel. | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | 5 months -------------------------------------------------------------------- Minesweepers | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7 Trawlers |25 |18 |23 |14 |30 |13 |27 |28 |33 |24 | 41 -------------------------------------------------------------------- It will be seen from these figures that the forecast of June was inaccurate even for the three succeeding months and that the total deficit in the five months was considerable, except in the case of T.B.D.'s and "P" boats. The most disappointing figures were those relating to submarines, trawlers and minesweepers. The case of the submarines may be put in another way, thus: In the June forecast twenty-six submarines were forecasted for delivery during the period July to the end of December, the dates of three, however, being somewhat uncertain; of this total of twenty-six, _only nine were actually delivered_. Of the remainder, seven were shown in a November forecast as delayed for four months, two for five months, and one for nine months. The attention of the Production Departments was continually directed to the very serious effect which the delay was producing on our anti-submarine measures, and the First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, was informed of the difficult position which was arising. In the early part of December I pointed out to the Third Sea Lord and the Admiralty Controller, Sir Allan Anderson, that it was obviously impossible for the Naval Staff to frame future policy unless some dependence could be placed on the forecast of deliveries. The Controller in reply stated that accurate forecasts were most difficult, and proposed a discussion with the Third Sea Lord and myself, but I had left the Admiralty before the discussion took place.