The Crisis of the Naval WarJellicoe, John Rushworth
History
The Crisis of the Naval War
Jellicoe, John Rushworth
World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations, British
The Germans had always built their small craft rapidly, although their
heavy ships were longer in construction than our own. Their destroyers
were completed in a little over twelve months from the official date of
order in pre-war days. During the early years of the war it would seem
that they maintained this figure, and they succeeded in building their
smaller submarines of the U.B. and U.C. types in some six to eight
months, as U.B. and U.C. boats began to be delivered as early as April,
1915, and it is certain that they were not ordered before August, 1914.
The time taken by the Germans to build submarines of the U type was
estimated by us at twelve months, and that of submarine cruisers at
eighteen months. German submarine officers gave the time as eight to ten
months for a U-boat and eighteen months for a submarine cruiser.
(It is to be observed that Captain Persius in a recent article gives a
much longer period for the construction of the German submarines. It is
not stated whether he had access to official figures, and his statement
is not in agreement with the figures given by German submarine
officers.)
It is of interest to note here the rate of ship production attained by
some firms in the United States of America during the war.
As I mention later (_Vide_ Chapter vi, p. 157), the Bethlehem Steel
Company, under Mr. Schwab's guidance, produced ten submarines for us in
five months from the date of the order. Mr. Schwab himself informed me
that towards the end of the war he was turning out large destroyers in
six weeks. The Ford Company, as is well known, produced submarine
chasers of the "Eagle" type in even a shorter period, but these vessels
were of special design and construction.
I have dealt so far with the question of anti-submarine measures
involving only the use of destroyers and other small surface craft.
There were, of course, other methods both in use and under consideration
early in 1917 when we took stock of the situation.
For some time we had been using _Decoy vessels_, and with some success;
it was possible to increase the number of these ships at the cost of
taking merchant ships off the trade routes or by building. A very
considerable increase was arranged.
The use of our own _submarines_ offensively against enemy submarines had
also been tried, and had met with occasional success, but our numbers
were very limited (the total in December, 1916, fit for oversea or
anti-submarine work was about forty). They were much needed for
reconnaissance and offensive work against surface men-of-war in enemy
waters, and only a few were at the time available for anti-submarine
operations, and then only at the cost of other important services.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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