be faced, and for some months of 1917 from eight to twelve Grand Fleet destroyers were used for trade protection in the Atlantic, principally from Irish ports, in addition to those protecting trade in the North Sea. It is interesting to note the number of persons who claim to have been the first to urge the Admiralty to adopt convoys as a method of protecting merchant ships against submarine attack. The claimants for this distinction are not confined to Great Britain; the great majority of them are people without any knowledge of the sea and naval matters, certainly none of them possessed any knowledge of the number of vessels needed to afford protection to the ships under convoy, nor of the vessels which we could produce for the purpose at the time. Possibly the facts related above may serve to show that convoys were commenced by Admiralty direction, and that they were started as soon as and extended as rapidly as the necessary protecting vessels could be provided. Those who argued then, or who have argued since, that we should have reduced the number of destroyers with the Grand Fleet will not, I think, meet with any support from those who served in that Fleet, especially from the officers upon whom lay the responsibility for countering any move of the High Sea Fleet. The entry of the United States into the war early in April eased the situation somewhat. First it was hoped that the United States Navy would assist us with destroyers and other small craft, and secondly it was a fact that the great majority of the material imported into countries contiguous to Germany came from the United States. There was reason to anticipate that steps would be taken by the United States authorities in the direction of some form of rationing of these countries, and in these circumstances it was justifiable to reduce gradually the strength of our blockading squadron of armed merchant vessels known as the 10th Cruiser Squadron. By this means we could at once provide additional vessels to act as convoying cruisers.