Causation; Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, German; Reason
We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox
which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal
sense (§ 6), namely—how this sense represents us to our own
consciousness, only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in
ourselves, because, to wit, we intuite ourselves only as we are
inwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as we
thus stand in a passive relation to ourselves; and therefore in the
systems of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one
with the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully
distinguish them.
That which determines the internal sense is the understanding, and its
original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of
bringing this under an apperception (upon which rests the possibility
of the understanding itself). Now, as the human understanding is not in
itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power,
in order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the
synthesis of understanding is, considered per se, nothing but the unity
of action, of which, as such, it is self-conscious, even apart from
sensibility, by which, moreover, it is able to determine our internal
sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to it according
to the form of sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of a
transcendental synthesis of imagination, the understanding exercises an
activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is; and so we are
right in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby.
Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same
with the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our
synthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to
the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition
of objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the
form of intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the
manifold therein, and consequently does not contain any determined
intuition, which is possible only through consciousness of the
determination of the manifold by the transcendental act of the
imagination (synthetical influence of the understanding on the internal
sense), which I have named figurative synthesis.
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