"The pleas of the advocates of internal improvement," wrote a contemporary authority of high standing on economic questions, "are these: That very extensive public works, designed for the benefit of the whole Union, and carried through vast portions of its area, must be accomplished. That an object so essential ought not to be left at the mercy of such an accident as the cordial agreement of the requisite number of states, to carry such works forward to their completion; that the surplus funds accruing from the whole nation cannot be as well employed as in promoting works in which the whole nation will be benefited; and that as the interests of the majority have hitherto upheld Congress in the use of this power, it may be assumed to be the will of the majority that Congress should continue to exercise it. "The answer is that it is inexpedient to put a vast and increasing patronage into the hands of the general Government; that only a very superficial knowledge can be looked for in members of Congress as to the necessity or value of works proposed to be instituted in any parts of the states, from the impossibility or undesirableness of equalizing the amount of appropriation made to each; that useless works would be proposed from the spirit of competition or individual interest; and that corruption, coëxtensive with the increase of power, would deprave the functions of the general Government.... To an impartial observer it appears that Congress has no constitutional right to devote the public funds to internal improvements, at its own unrestricted will and pleasure; that the permitted usurpation of the power for so long a time indicates that some degree of such power in the hands of the general Government is desirable and necessary; that such power should be granted through an amendment of the constitution, by the methods therein provided; that, in the meantime, it is perilous that the instrument should be strained for the support of any function, however desirable its exercise may be. "In case of the proposed addition being made to the constitution, arrangements will, of course, be entered into for determining the principles by which general are to be distinguished from local objects or whether such distinction can, on any principle, be fixed; for testing the utility of proposed objects; for checking extravagant expenditure, jobbing, and corrupt patronage; in short, the powers of Congress will be specified, here as in other matters, by express permission and prohibition."[6]