During the morning of the 17th General Brulard, who had succeeded General Bailloud in command of the French contingent, came over to Imbros with his Staff to say good-bye. Generals Davies and Byng, with the Staffs of the VIIIth and IXth Corps, followed. To say good-bye to his own Staff, Sir Ian rode to the new Headquarters at the entrance of the main valley across the bay, whither he was himself to have removed that very afternoon. To the army he issued the following special order as farewell: [Sidenote: SIR IAN LEAVES THE PENINSULA] “On handing over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to General Sir Charles Monro, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to say a few farewell words to the Allied troops, with many of whom he has now for so long been associated. First, he would like them to know his deep sense of the honour it has been to command so fine an army in one of the most arduous and difficult campaigns which have ever been undertaken; secondly, he must express to them his admiration of the noble response which they have invariably given to the calls he has made upon them. No risk has been too desperate; no sacrifice too great. Sir Ian Hamilton thanks all ranks, from Generals to private soldiers, for the wonderful way they have seconded his efforts to lead them towards that decisive victory which, under their new Chief, he has the most implicit confidence they will achieve.” On the _Triad_ he said good-bye to Admiral de Robeck, and to Commodore Roger Keyes, the Admiral’s Chief of Staff. He then embarked on the cruiser _Chatham_. As she passed down Kephalos Bay, each of the war vessels manned ship in salute. Cape Kephalos was rounded; Suvla, Anzac, and the Helles of the landings were seen by their Commander-in-Chief for the last time, and the Peninsula, which had been the dramatic stage of such high hopes, noble achievement, and bitter frustration, faded in the distance, as the living events there enacted were already fading into a story of the past. _Note._--After the failure of the military operations in August, a section of responsible naval officers, foremost among whom were Admiral Wemyss and Sir John de Robeck’s Chief of the Staff, Commodore Keyes, held very strongly that the fleet should renew the attempt to force the Straits in order to relieve the army. A plan of operations had been worked out, with the assent of Sir John de Robeck. It was thought by these officers that, if three or four battleships and six or eight destroyers could pass through the Straits, they would be able, in combination with the submarines, to dominate the Sea of Marmora, thus cutting the main Turkish lines of communication and supply, which ran from the Asiatic side of the Peninsula. Sir John de Robeck was not in favour of this project (_Second Dardanelles Report_, p. 55).