“They (the experts) were there--that was the reason, and the only reason, for their being there--to give the lay members the benefit of their advice.... To suppose that these experts were tongue-tied or paralysed by a nervous regard for the possible opinion of their political superiors is to suppose that they had really abdicated the functions which they were intended to discharge.”[27] These views appear so reasonable that we might suppose them unofficial, had not the speakers occupied the highest official positions themselves. The result of this difference of opinion regarding the duty of expert advisers was disastrous. The War Council assumed the silence of the experts to imply acquiescence, whereas it sprang from obedience to etiquette. Before the Commission, Lord Fisher stated that from the first he was “instinctively against it” (_i.e._ against Admiral Carden’s plan);[28] that he “was dead against the naval operation alone because he knew it must be a failure”; and he added, “I must reiterate that as a purely naval operation I think it was doomed to failure.”[29] It may be supposed that these statements were prophecies after the event, and the Commissioners observe that Lord Fisher did not at the time record any such strongly adverse opinions. Nevertheless, on the very day when a demonstration was first discussed, he wrote privately to Mr. Churchill: “I consider the attack on Turkey holds the field, but only if it is immediate; however, it won’t be. We shall decide on a futile bombardment of the Dardanelles, which wears out the invaluable guns of the _Indefatigable_, which probably will require replacement. What good resulted from the last bombardment? Did it move a single Turk from the Caucasus?”[30]