The German submarines have had greater opportunities of paring down our Navy than we theirs. This applies especially to the early days of the war, when, owing to the total unexpectedness of the upheaval, before experience had taught us how to deal with these unseen craft, they failed entirely to achieve anything that caused us alarm from a military standpoint. A few ancient cruisers fell to them, three of which, the _Aboukir_, the _Hogue_, and the _Cressy_, were so destroyed while indulging in a perfectly human desire to save life. All the ships so sunk were easy targets owing to slow speed. So far not one really fast modern vessel has been sunk by this form of attack. If it could ever be known, which I fear is impossible, how many torpedoes have been fired at warships without taking effect (and the number is large), it would only go to show the difficulties encountered by the submarine and the immunity of the fast vessel. Add to this the large number of enemy submarines destroyed, nearly all by means evolved since war began (a period notoriously difficult in which to carry out experiments), and it is only reasonable to presume that, when times of peace come again, it will not be long before means are arrived at which will render surface vessels almost entirely immune from this form of attack. Everyone is agreed that one of the brightest spots in our campaign in the Dardanelles has been supplied by the British submarines. If there are still people at home who ask what the Navy is doing, one can point to these vessels as an example of what the whole Navy would do had they any scope in which to exercise their activities. But we are dealing with an enemy who feels that he has nothing to gain and everything to lose by seeking an engagement. The impossibility of forcing his stronghold must be obvious to the least enlightened. Our submarines out here have penetrated what most naval men would have declared to be an impassable barrier until it became an achieved fact. Think of the obstacles their crews have surmounted: rows of mines susceptible to the lightest touch, nets completely across the Narrows, and last, but not least, a strong current flowing seawards. Only then can you begin to realise the difficulties and dangers in endeavouring to gain an entrance into the Sea of Marmora and the main sea route for the Turkish water-borne supplies. The following signal, typical of many others, "E— arrived in Sea of Marmora without trouble, torpedoed a steamer in False Bay on her way," furnishes an indication that these desperate ventures are undertaken as a matter of course.