The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductionsPlato
PhilosophyPhilosophy
The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato
Dialogues, Greek -- Translations into English; Philosophy, Ancient
which the nature of the soul is described has not much to do with the
popular doctrine of the ideas. Yet there is one little trait in the
description which shows that they are present to Plato’s mind, namely,
the remark that the soul, which had seen truths in the form of the
universal (248 C, 249 C), cannot again return to the nature of an animal.
[Sidenote: _The conception of them in Meno, Phaedrus, Phaedo,_]
In the Phaedo, as in the Meno, the origin of ideas is sought for in a
previous state of existence. There was no time when they could have been
acquired in this life, and therefore they must have been recovered from
another. The process of recovery is no other than the ordinary law of
association, by which in daily life the sight of one thing or person
recalls another to our minds, and by which in scientific enquiry from any
part of knowledge we may be led on to infer the whole. It is also argued
that ideas, or rather ideals, must be derived from a previous state of
existence because they are more perfect than the sensible forms of them
which are given by experience (74 ff.). But in the Phaedo the doctrine of
ideas is subordinate to the proof of the immortality of the soul. ‘If the
soul existed in a previous state, then it will exist in a future state,
for a law of alternation pervades all things.’ And, ‘If the ideas exist,
then the soul exists; if not, not.’ It is to be observed, both in the
Meno and the Phaedo, that Socrates expresses himself with diffidence.
He speaks in the Phaedo (114 D, 115 D) of the words with which he has
comforted himself and his friends, and will not be too confident that the
description which he has given of the soul and her mansions is exactly
true, but he ‘ventures to think that something of the kind is true.’
And in the Meno, after dwelling upon the immortality of the soul, he
adds, ‘Of some things which I have said I am not altogether confident’
(cp. 86 C, and Apology, pp. 40 ff.; Gorgias 527 B). From this class of
uncertainties he exempts the difference between truth and appearance, of
which he is absolutely convinced (98 B).
[Sidenote: _in the Republic and Timaeus._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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