_Soc._ You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round? _Men._ Very true. _Soc._ To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know what you 75 are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not understand that I am looking for the ‘simile in multis’? And then he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that ‘simile in multis’ which you call figure, and which includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue. _Men._ I would rather that you should answer, Socrates. _Soc._ Shall I indulge you? _Men._ By all means. [Sidenote: _Definition of colour and figure._] _Soc._ And then you will tell me about virtue? _Men._ I will. _Soc._ Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won. _Men._ Certainly. [Sidenote: Figure is defined by Socrates to be that which always follows colour.] _Soc._ Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you say to this answer?—Figure is the only thing which always follows colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue? _Men._ But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer. _Soc._ Why simple? _Men._ Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows colour. (_Soc._ Granted). _Men._ But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is—what sort of answer would you have given him? _Soc._ I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician’s vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity?—all which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated—that is all which I am saying—not anything very difficult. _Men._ Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.