The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductionsPlato
PhilosophyPhilosophy
The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato
Dialogues, Greek -- Translations into English; Philosophy, Ancient
There may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms
the concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not
mean to intimate that the supernatural or divine is the true basis of
human life. To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of all
things the most divine. Yet, like other philosophers, he is willing to
admit that ‘probability is the guide of life[1];’ and he is at the same
time desirous of contrasting the wisdom which governs the world with a
higher wisdom. There are many instincts, judgments, and anticipations of
the human mind which cannot be reduced to rule, and of which the grounds
cannot always be given in words. A person may have some skill or latent
experience which he is able to use himself and is yet unable to teach
others, because he has no principles, and is incapable of collecting
or arranging his ideas. He has practice, but not theory; art, but not
science. This is a true fact of psychology, which is recognized by Plato
in this passage. But he is far from saying, as some have imagined, that
inspiration or divine grace is to be regarded as higher than knowledge.
He would not have preferred the poet or man of action to the philosopher,
or the virtue of custom to the virtue based upon ideas.
Also here, as in the Ion and Phaedrus, Plato appears to acknowledge an
unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only has
knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There may be
a sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But there
is no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he is
deriding the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the Symposium, or of
oracles in the Apology, or of divine intimations when he is speaking of
the daemonium of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right opinion,
as well as the higher one of science, in the spirit of one who desires
to include in his philosophy every aspect of human life; just as he
recognizes the existence of popular opinion as a fact, and the Sophists
as the expression of it.
[Sidenote: _Some lesser traits of the Dialogue._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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