_Euth._ Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men. _Soc._ That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little 13 point about which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of ‘attention’? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so? _Euth._ Certainly. [Sidenote: _What is the meaning of attention?_] _Soc._ I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses? _Euth._ Yes. _Soc._ Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman? _Euth._ True. _Soc._ And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs? _Euth._ Yes. _Soc._ As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen? _Euth._ Very true. _Soc._ In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?—that would be your meaning, Euthyphro? _Euth._ Yes. [Sidenote: Attention to others is designed to benefit and improve them. But how are the gods benefited or improved by the holy acts of men?] _Soc._ And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman’s art they are benefited and improved, are they not? _Euth._ True. _Soc._ As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman’s art, and the oxen by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt? _Euth._ Certainly, not for their hurt. _Soc._ But for their good? _Euth._ Of course. _Soc._ And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better? _Euth._ No, no; that was certainly not what I meant. _Soc._ And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not. _Euth._ You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention which I mean. [Sidenote: _Euthyphro grows impatient of the argument._] [Sidenote: The attention to the gods called piety is such as servants show their masters.] _Soc._ Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety? _Euth._ It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters. _Soc._ I understand—a sort of ministration to the gods. _Euth._ Exactly.