The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductionsPlato
PhilosophyPhilosophy
The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato
Dialogues, Greek -- Translations into English; Philosophy, Ancient
_Soc._ And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am,
as you are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend,
the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to
exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding
me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what
I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings—
‘Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,
You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence.’
Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what
respect?
_Euth._ By all means.
[Sidenote: We may say, e. g., that wherever there is reverence there will
be fear, but not that wherever there is fear there will be reverence.]
_Soc._ I should not say that where there is fear there is also
reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and
disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they
reverence the objects of their fear.
_Euth._ Very true.
_Soc._ But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has
a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any
action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.
[Sidenote: _Euthyphro in the hands of Socrates._]
_Euth._ No doubt.
_Soc._ Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear
there is also reverence; and we should say, where there is
reverence there is also fear. But there is not always reverence
where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion,
and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of
number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd.
I suppose that you follow me now?
_Euth._ Quite well.
_Soc._ That was the sort of question which I meant to raise
when I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the
pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice
where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended
notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?
_Euth._ No, I think that you are quite right.
_Soc._ Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we
should enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry
in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked me what
is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I
should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which
represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not
agree?
_Euth._ Yes, I quite agree.
[Sidenote: Piety or holiness is that part of justice which attends upon
the gods.]
_Soc._ In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of
justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus
not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now
adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness,
and their opposites.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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