As to the conveniences to be derived from the Islands laying between us and Cadiz, I took some pains to examine into that matter. We had maps and descriptions of them all, and our master had been at many of them. I found there was not a single harbor in any one of them in which a ship could ride at anchor in every wind; on the contrary neither of them has anything more than open roads, out of which it is necessary for ships to make the best of their way, and put to sea whenever certain winds blow, a task which our ship was very far from being in condition to perform. From this and other circumstances it was evident we could not refit in either of those Islands, not even so much as get a new rudder; for admitting materials for the latter could be had, yet such was the difficulty, if not impossibility, of hanging it in an open road, from whence the ship was every moment exposed to the necessity of going to sea by an unfavorable wind, that we could expect to derive no advantage from these Islands, except the prospect of obtaining some refreshments, which we could do without, and the value of which would not have compensated for the risk of approaching them in our condition. As to the idea of our steering that course with a view of being landed on one of those Islands, and from thence going to Europe in another vessel, leaving our own to her fate, no earthly consideration could ever have reconciled me to it. The reasoning which was insisted on, that our being seasonably in Europe was of more importance to the United States than a frigate, and that in time of war, and for the public good, lives were to be risked by sea as well as by land, was a species of reasoning which applied to this case led to conclusions, which never have been, and I pray God never may be, among my principles of action. Had this plan of being landed on one of the Azores or Canaries been adopted, we should have either landed the crew with us or not; if the first, the frigate would have been given to destruction. This appeared to me inconsistent with the public good, because, if we reached Martinique, I had no doubt of a passage, and my arrival in France eight weeks sooner or later did not appear to me of equal importance to the United States with the frigate. Had the crew been left on board, it must have been with a view of saving the ship, either by her reaching Europe or the West Indies. The probability of her effecting either became then a most important question, as the lives of between two and three hundred Americans depended on the event. Against it were opposed the dangers of the seas, and the want of provisions; the former would have increased with the approach of winter, and therefore the longer the ship was detained to the northward, the more she had to suffer, and to fear. The frigate after having landed us on either of the Islands, must either have gone on towards Europe, or endeavored to get to the West Indies.