In a monarchy this power need not be officially vested in a Minister, because he can have constant intercourse with the Sovereign, and by that means he is in the daily exercise of it. Where the sovereignty is vested in a public body of men, such an intercourse is impracticable; and I am persuaded that a Minister who would venture to execute the duties of his office with vigor, without possessing uncontrolled the power of dismission, would in a few months put it out of his power to proceed in his business, and Congress would have full employment to hear and determine between him and suspended officers. On the contrary, if a dismissed officer can have no appeal but to the laws of the land, Congress will not be troubled, business may be conducted with decision, and the very knowledge that such a power exists, will have a tendency to prevent the frequent exercise of it, after the first reforms are effected. I have been told, that some gentlemen considered the expressions in my letter to Congress on this subject so general as that they might be construed to comprehend the Commander in Chief, Heads of Department, &c. But this cannot be. The Commander in Chief is not concerned himself, but employs others in the expenditure of public money, to whom he grants warrants or drafts on the military chest; and the persons so employed ought to be accountable, and subject to dismission. I suppose officers of the army may frequently be so employed, and in that case it cannot be supposed, that the power of the Financier extends to the military commission, for it certainly must be confined to the money matters. There is one exception with respect to what I have said of the Commander in Chief, and that is the expenditures for secret service, and in this respect I think he should be responsible to the Sovereign only. The Quarter Master General, having a military as well as a civil duty, he cannot be under the control of the Financier, for the first, although he certainly ought to be the last, which has great connexion with heavy expense, and perhaps it would be best, that he should execute all the business of expenditures by one or more deputies, which would exonerate him from that power, which they must be subjected to. The Commissary General, and every person employed under him, are the immediate objects of this power. The Paymaster General, may be considered as a channel of conveyance, through which money passes from the treasury to the army, and as he is subjected to the law military, the Minister of Finance needs no other authority over him and his officers, than the power of putting under arrest and suspending for mal-conduct in office.