The first was dated 9th April last. It expressed the opinion of the Count de Vergennes, that the Court of St James had formed a design to make a separate peace with one or more of the powers at war with it. That France was perfectly easy with respect to the disposition of Congress; and that the uniformity and steadfastness of their conduct did not leave the least doubt with regard to the part they would take in this circumstance. That the steps the King had taken on a similar occasion, and the disappointment of several British emissaries, was already known to Congress. That they had met with the same reception at Madrid; and there was the greatest probability, that their intrigues would not be more successful at the Hague. The Minister of France observed, that the glory and honor of the present confederacy, of which his Majesty was the centre, would be their having been inaccessible to artifice; and this extraordinary instance would be crowned with success, if the four powers persisted invariably in a firm attachment to their union, and if, on the one hand, making the greatest exertions to procure the completest satisfaction, they, on the other hand, confined themselves within such bounds of moderation as would give no umbrage to any one of the powers at war with Great Britain. That the King had, in different circumstances, taken the proper measures to deprive the enemy of all hopes, which they might have formed of introducing dissensions between his Majesty and his allies. That it was to be wished, that the Court of London was fully convinced of the impossibility of treating separately with America. That this had always been the chimerical and favorite idea of England; and that so long as it subsisted, there would perhaps be no possibility of treating seriously about the conditions of a peace. That their negotiations would only be an artifice to scatter divisions among the allies, and retard their exertions for continuing the war. That the shortest way to put a stop to their intrigues, would be to let it be known publicly in the most explicit manner, that the United States neither can nor will make any peace without the concurrence of their ally; and that if England has any overtures of peace to make to them, the American Plenipotentiaries are sufficiently empowered to receive them, and to negotiate a peace, if those overtures are admissible.