The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 11
History
The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 11
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1775-1783; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Sources
That this peremptory language would free Congress from all the
embarrassments, which the English Ministers could throw in the way;
that it would bring them to a sincere disposition to make peace; put
an end forever to their machinations with the mediating powers;
deprive them of the means of feeding the Parliament and people of
England with the hopes of a separate peace; and finally save the
Americans from all the difficulties, which would infallibly take place
if England were allowed to negotiate in America. It would convince
England, that the United States are not less attached to their
engagements with their ally than sensible of the respect due to the
Courts of Vienna and Petersburg, whose mediation Congress have
accepted.
The Minister added, that though the situation of the belligerent
powers, the distance of America, and the slowness and difficulty of
communication made it advantageous that the seat of negotiation should
be in Europe, and that the enemy should be informed of this
resolution, yet Congress had the fullest liberty to follow the system
which France had pointed out in her answer to the mediating powers, in
consequence of which the American Ministers might negotiate
immediately and directly, conformably to the instructions they had
received from Congress; but the negotiations of France and America
would be carried on in an equal progression, a continual and
reciprocal communication would be given, and the two treaties signed
at the same time, and one be ineffectual without the other.
The Count de Vergennes in the same despatch, gave information of the
Dutch having acknowledged the independence of America, of which
Congress are already informed.
The letters of May 2d and June 28th, urged the same point of referring
the British negotiators in America to the American Plenipotentiaries
in Europe, with this addition in the letter of May 2d, that it was now
evidently the object of Great Britain to lessen their exertions on
this continent as much as in their power, and to adopt a defensive
mode of carrying on the war; that being unable to support a double war
by land and by sea, she proposed to suspend the one in order to carry
on the other more effectually; and in case of success, to return
against the United States with redoubled efforts.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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