1st. To determine whether the impost will act proportionably or not, we must consider in what respect the proportion is to be taken. If it be a proportion between two of the States, that will be considered under the second head; if it be a proportion among the people of the same State, it is only recurring to the question, whether the taxes on consumption are useful; for so long as no man pays the tax, but he who chooses to purchase the article, the disproportion, if any, is of his own creating. The necessity of a revenue to a certain amount must be admitted. Is it then wise to raise a part of it from the _consumption_ of foreign articles? I say the consumption, because the tax undoubtedly falls on the consumer and not on the importer. If this be not a wise tax, what shall we substitute? Articles of primary and immediate necessity are made in the State of Rhode Island. Both food and raiment can be had without crossing the Atlantic in search of them. Every man, therefore, is at liberty to use foreign articles or not. If he does use them the tax is voluntary, and therefore cannot be considered as disproportionate, any more than for one man to wear silk while another wears wool. 2dly. That Rhode Island consumes more foreign commodities in proportion than any other State in the Union, cannot be admitted. Rhode Island certainly makes many commodities, but the more southern States are in the habit of importing everything. 3dly. That Rhode Island is, from its situation, liable to the unhappy accidents of war is true; but this incidental evil, arising from an advantageous position, cannot be adduced as a plea for exemption from public burdens. New York has suffered, at least as much and as long. 4thly. That the exclusive benefits of an impost should be carried to the State where it is collected, is a position unjust in itself, and which would forever prevent any duties; wherefore it would cut off not only one of the most productive, but one of the most useful branches of revenue. Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and some other States carry on the commerce of their neighbors as well as their own, from which they derive great riches. The duties are always (like the risks and the expenses) paid by the consumer; for unless this be so, no tolerable reason can be assigned, why foreign commodities should be dearer in war than in peace. If then a considerable duty were laid by the commercial State, it would fall on its uncommercial neighbor. That neighbor, therefore, would immediately take measures to carry on its own commerce, and prohibit the bringing of articles from the commercial State. Those measures would produce a repeal of the duty. I take no notice here of the altercations which would arise; it is sufficient to show, that the private view of revenue for the State would be defeated.