The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 12
History
The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 12
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1775-1783; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Sources
5thly, and 6thly. These objections do not appear to me to apply,
because in the first place, I can hardly suppose the neighboring
States will ever think of laying duties on the produce, for if any of
them should, her citizens would be the sufferers. Secondly, if the
article of produce be left uncontrolled by the government every
individual will be a check on the avidity of his neighbors, and if by
this means a piece of American goods can be vended cheaper in Rhode
Island than a piece of foreign goods, the consumer in Rhode Island
will by the purchase of it save money to himself, and therefore to
the country. And as the duty is collected only on foreign goods he
will not pay the duty, and of course the duty on his State will be so
much the less.
7thly. The seventh objection will apply more strongly to almost any
other kind of tax, because this may be collected by a very small
number of men.
8thly. The eighth objection I cannot admit, because forming my opinion
of that State from what I conceive to be the character of the
gentleman who makes the objection, I cannot believe it to be valid.
Smuggling was formerly not disreputable because it was the evading of
laws, which were not made by proper authority, and therefore not
obligatory; but nothing can be more infamous than to defraud our own
government of so poor a pittance; and I trust, that if any individual
were inclined to do so, he would be detected by the first person who
saw him, and would be as much exposed to the resentment and contempt
of his fellow citizens as an informer would have been in the times
alluded to.
9thly. The last objection ought not to be made, because there is no
reason to suppose, that Congress would devise means to oppress their
fellow citizens. But it is one of our greatest misfortunes, that men
are apt to reason from one thing to another that is very dissimilar.
The parliament of England cared nothing about the consequences of laws
made for us, because they were not affected by them. This is always
the case under such circumstances, and forms one of the most powerful
arguments in favor of free governments. But how can it be supposed,
that a member of Congress who is liable to be recalled at a moment's
warning would join in measures which are oppressive to the people, and
which he must necessarily himself feel the weight of, without deriving
any advantage from them. For it is not here as in England, that there
is a King to buy votes for bad purposes. If the members of Congress be
seduced, it must be by the Congress, which is absurd. If indeed the
Congress were either an hereditary body, self-existent, or if they
were self-elected, there might be room for apprehension, but as they
are, there can be none.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account