In the first place, what would they do with the most important conquests? Russia was in possession of Poland, Prussia of Saxony, and Austria of a great portion of Italy. Should the Emperor Alexander attempt to set up a sort of kingdom in Poland, the interests of Austria would suffer. Again, could Prussia be permitted to enlarge her dominions by the addition of Saxony? All these questions were already subjects of debate in the diplomatic body, which, to all outward appearance, was still perfectly united; the most unlimited confidence in each other was expressed by all parties, but, in reality, interest and selfishness were the prevailing feelings. Lord Castlereagh shewed great ability at this juncture by constituting himself the general bond of union of the coalition. With regard to the questions connected with the government of France, it was hardly possible to suppose Austria would agree to a project of a change of dynasty, when an archduchess held the reins of government as regent. The Emperor Alexander had entered into a private contract with Bernadotte, whose feelings against Napoleon were very bitter. Alexander would agree to any form of government that might be proposed, but in the conference at Abo all possibilities had been discussed, even one which might place Bernadotte at the head of affairs in France. England, though well inclined towards the Bourbons, did not make their restoration so indispensable a condition as to render debates upon matters of more personal interest subordinate to it. Lord Castlereagh had explained this to the exiled princes; they had not yet been permitted to land upon the Continent, and the Comte d'Artois did not arrive at Dole until January, 1814. It is particularly in this point of view that the history of the Congress of Chatillon is deserving of a serious study. At this meeting there was still an evident desire on the part of Austria to conclude a treaty on the basis of the balance of power in Europe; but, from the very commencement, Metternich must have discovered that the position of Austria was no longer the same as at the beginning of the campaign. All moral influence had now passed over to the side of the Emperor Alexander, who had become the arbiter of the destinies of the coalition; Prussia and Austria only appeared in the light of useful auxiliaries, the principal influence and popularity rested with the czar; he alone was talked of, and the negotiations were especially addressed to his cabinet. The military treaty of Chaumont, which fixed the number of troops to be furnished by the coalition, was dictated by Lord Castlereagh, who was afraid of a dissolution of the alliance. It was then declared that the allied powers would never sheathe the sword till they had reduced France within the limits it occupied in 1792; and, for this purpose, each cabinet promised a contingent of 150,000 men under arms, England agreeing to furnish a subsidy.[5]