So that in the first sense I yeeld, that there is but one world, which is all that the arguments do prove, but understand it in the second sense, and so I affirme there may be more nor doe any of the above named objections prove the cõtrary. Neither can this opinion derogate from the divine Wisdome (as _Aquinas_ thinkes) but rather advance it, shewing a _compendium_ of providence, that could make the same body a world, and a Moone; a world for habitation, and a Moone for the use of others, and the ornament of the whole frame of Nature. For as the members of the body serve not onely for the preservation of themselves, but for the use and conveniency of the whole, as the hand protects the head as well as saves it selfe,[1] so is it in the parts of the Universe, where each one may serve, as well for the conservation of that which is within it, as the helpe of others without it. [Sidenote 1: _Cusanus de doct. ignor. l. 2. c. 12._] I have now in some measure, shewed that a plurality of worlds does not contradict any principle of reason or place of Scripture, and so cleared the first part of that supposition which is applied in the opinion. It may next be enquired; whether ’tis possible there may be a globe of elements in that which we call the æthereall parts of the Universe; for if this (as it is according to the common opinion) be priviledged from any change or corruption, it will be in vaine then to imagine any element there, and if we will have another world, we must then seeke out some other place for its situation. The third Proposition therefore shall be this. Proposition 3. _That the heavens doe not consist of any such pure matter which can priviledge them from the like change and corruption, as these inferiour bodies are liable unto._ It hath beene often questioned amongst the ancient Fathers and Philosophers, what kind of matter that should be, of which the heavens are framed, whether or no of any fifth substance distinct from the foure elements, as _Aristotle_[1] holds, and with him some of the late Schoolemen, whose subtill braines could not be content to attribute to those vast glorious bodies, but common materialls, and therefore they themselves had rather take paines to preferre them to some extraordinary nature, whereas notwithstanding, all the arguments they could invent, were not able to convince a necessity of any such matter, as is confest by their owne[2]* side. It were much to be desired, thst these men had not in other cases, as well as this, multiplied things without necessity, and as if there had not beene enough to be knowne in the secrets of nature, have spun out new subjects from their owne braines to finde more worke for future ages, I shall not mention their arguments, since ’tis already confest, that they are none of them of any necessary consequence, and besides, you may see them set downe in any of the bookes _de Cœlo._ [Sidenote 1: _De Cœlo., l. 1. cap. 2._]