1. Because the Scriptures tell us thus much: _Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil._ And that there are many deceivers: _For many shall come in my Name, saying, I am Christ, and shall deceive many. And woe unto you, when all men shall speak well of you: for so did their fathers to the false Prophets._ From whence it is plain, that first we are to consider and be assured, that the matter be not evil; for if it be, we are not at all to be swayed with the multitudes that follow it, or that uphold it: so if the opinion be evil, erroneous, or false, we ought not to receive it, or adhere unto it, though never so many do hold or maintain it. So that in truth and substance, we are not at all to consider, whether there be few or many that hold it, but simply, whether it be true or not. For as _Plato_ tells us: _Neq; id considerandum quid dixerit, sed utrum verè dicatur nec ne_. For the multitude have been by all good Authors and Learned men always esteemed the most erroneous, as _Seneca_ saith: _Quærendum non quod vulgo placet, pessimo veritatis interpreti_. And _Lactantius_ teaches us this: _Vulgus indoctum pompis inanibus gaudet, animisq; puerilibus spectat omnia, oblectatur frivolis, nec ponderare secum unamquamq; rem potest_. And our Saviour gives us a proof and instance of the errour of the multitude, and that in matter of fact. Did not almost all the Jews under divers Kings Raigns applaud and approve of the doctrine and opinions of the false Prophets, though utterly erroneous? insomuch that _Elijah_ said, that he only was left of the true Prophets, though the false ones were many and numerous. So that the Rule is proved to be true, both by the precept and example of the Scriptures. 2. If we consider the generality of Mankind, either in respect of their inclinations and dispositions, or their breeding and education, we shall not find one of an hundred, either by nature inclined, or by education fitted and qualified to search forth and understand the truth. And then if there be an hundred to one drowned in ignorance and errors, and so few fitted to understand the truth of things either divine or natural, then it must needs follow, that it is not safe to embrace or adhere to an opinion, because of the great number of those that hold or maintain it, but rather to stick to the smaller number; though neither simply ought to be regarded, but truth it self. 3. Again, if we consider those numbers, that either by nature are inclined, or by education trained up in Learning, to enable them to judge rightly betwixt truth and truth-likeliness, how few of these that prove any thing excellent in those parts of Learning wherein they are bred, we may easily see the verity of this Rule sufficiently proved, that it is not safe to embrace or adhere to an opinion, because the numbers are great that hold or maintain it.