Men have somewhat of their _own_, and _I_ am to recognize this own and hold it sacred. Their own consists partly in outward, partly in inward _possessions_. The former are things, the latter spiritualities, thoughts, convictions, noble feelings, etc. But I am always to respect only _rightful_ or _human_ possessions; the wrongful and unhuman I need not spare, for only _Man's_ own is men's real own. An inward possession of this sort is, _e. g._, religion; because _religion_ is free, _i. e._ is Man's, _I_ must not strike at it. Just so _honor_ is an inward possession; it is free and must not be struck at by me. (Action for insult, caricatures, etc.) Religion and honor are "spiritual property." In tangible property the person stands foremost: my person is my first property. Hence freedom of the person; but only the _rightful_ or human person is free, the other is locked up. Your life is your property; but it is sacred for men only if it is not that of an inhuman monster. What a man as such cannot defend of bodily goods, we may take from him: this is the meaning of competition, of freedom of occupation. What he cannot defend of spiritual goods falls a prey to us likewise: so far goes the liberty of discussion, of science, of criticism. But _consecrated_ goods are inviolable. Consecrated and guaranteed by whom? Proximately by the State, society, but properly by man or the "concept," the "concept of the thing": for the concept of consecrated goods is this, that they are truly human, or rather that the holder possesses them as man and not as un-man.[177] On the spiritual side man's faith is such goods, his honor, his moral feeling,--yes, his feeling of decency, modesty, etc. Actions (speeches, writings) that touch honor are punishable; attacks on "the foundation of all religion"; attacks on political faith; in short, attacks on everything that a man "rightly" has. How far critical liberalism would extend, the sanctity of goods,--on this point it has not yet made any pronouncement, and doubtless fancies itself to be ill-disposed toward all sanctity; but, as it combats egoism, it must set limits to it, and must not let the un-man pounce on the human. To its theoretical contempt for the "masses" there must correspond a practical snub if it should get into power. What extension the concept "man" receives, and what comes to the individual man through it,--what, therefore, man and the human are,--on this point the various grades of liberalism differ, and the political, the social, the humane man are each always claiming more than the other for "man." He who has best grasped this concept knows best what is "man's." The State still grasps this concept in political restriction, society in social; mankind, so it is said, is the first to comprehend it entirely, or "the history of mankind develops it." But, if "man is discovered," then we know also what pertains to man as his own, man's property, the human.