The Elementary Forms of the Religious LifeDurkheim, Émile
Religion
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life
Durkheim, Émile
Cults; Religion; Religion -- Philosophy; Rites and ceremonies; Totemism
We are now able to understand how the totemic principle, and in
general, every religious force, comes to be outside of the object in
which it resides.[717] It is because the idea of it is in no way made up
of the impressions directly produced by this thing upon our senses or
minds. Religious force is only the sentiment inspired by the group in
its members, but projected outside of the consciousnesses that
experience them, and objectified. To be objectified, they are fixed upon
some object which thus becomes sacred; but any object might fulfil this
function. In principle, there are none whose nature predestines them to
it to the exclusion of all others; but also there are none that are
necessarily impossible.[718] Everything depends upon the circumstances
which lead the sentiment creating religious ideas to establish itself
here or there, upon this point or upon that one. Therefore, the sacred
character assumed by an object is not implied in the intrinsic
properties of this latter: _it is added to them_. The world of religious
things is not one particular aspect of empirical nature; _it is
superimposed upon it_.
This conception of the religious, finally, allows us to explain an
important principle found at the bottom of a multitude of myths and
rites, and which may be stated thus: when a sacred thing is subdivided,
each of its parts remains equal to the thing itself. In other words, as
far as religious thought is concerned, the part is equal to the whole;
it has the same powers, the same efficacy. The debris of a relic has the
same virtue as a relic in good condition. The smallest drop of blood
contains the same active principle as the whole thing. The soul, as we
shall see, may be broken up into nearly as many pieces as there are
organs or tissues in the organism; each of these partial souls is worth
a whole soul. This conception would be inexplicable if the sacredness of
something were due to the constituent properties of the thing itself;
for in that case, it should vary with this thing, increasing and
decreasing with it. But if the virtues it is believed to possess are not
intrinsic in it, and if they come from certain sentiments which it
brings to mind and symbolizes, though these originate outside of it,
then, since it has no need of determined dimensions to play this rôle of
reminder, it will have the same value whether it is entire or not. Since
the part makes us think of the whole, it evokes the same sentiments as
the whole. A mere fragment of the flag represents the fatherland just as
well as the flag itself: so it is sacred in the same way and to the same
degree.[719]
V
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account