And these causes of names are the same with the causes of our conceptions, namely, some power of action, or affection of the thing conceived, which some call the manner by which any thing works upon our senses, but by most men they are called _accidents_; I say accidents, not in that sense in which accident is opposed to necessary; but so, as being neither the things themselves, nor parts thereof, do nevertheless accompany the things in such manner, that (saving extension) they may all perish, and be destroyed, but can never be abstracted. [Sidenote: The use and abuse of names abstract.] 4. There is also this difference betwixt _concrete_ and _abstract_ names, that those were invented before propositions, but these after; for these could have no being till there were propositions, from whose _copula_ they proceed. Now in all matters that concern this life, but chiefly in philosophy, there is both great use and great abuse of _abstract names_; and the use consists in this, that without them we cannot, for the most part, either reason, or compute the properties of bodies; for when we would multiply, divide, add, or substract heat, light, or motion, if we should double or add them together by concrete names, saying (for example) hot is double to hot, light double to light, or moved double to moved, we should not double the properties, but the bodies themselves that are hot, light, moved, &c. which we would not do. But the abuse proceeds from this, that some men seeing they can consider, that is (as I said before) bring into account the increasings and decreasings of quantity, heat and other accidents, without considering their bodies or subjects (which they call _abstracting_, or making to exist apart by themselves) they speak of accidents, as if they might be separated from all bodies. And from hence proceed the gross errors of writers of metaphysics; for, because they can consider thought without the consideration of body, they infer there is no need of a thinking-body; and because quantity may be considered without considering body, they think also that quantity may be without body, and body without quantity; and that a body has quantity by the addition of quantity to it. From the same fountain spring those insignificant words, _abstract substance_, _separated essence_, and the like; as also that confusion of words derived from the Latin verb _est_, as _essence_, _essentiality_, _entity_, _entitative_; besides _reality_, _aliquiddity_, _quiddity_, _&c._ which could never have been heard of among such nations as do not copulate their names by the verb _is_, but by adjective verbs, as runneth, readeth, &c. or by the mere placing of one name after another; and yet seeing such nations compute and reason, it is evident that philosophy has no need of those words _essence_, _entity_, and other the like barbarous terms. [Sidenote: Proposition, universal and particular.]