11. That fault of a syllogism which lies hid in the form thereof, will always be found either in the implication of the copula with one of the terms, or in the equivocation of some word; and in either of these ways there will be four terms, which (as I have shewn) cannot stand in a true syllogism. Now the implication of the copula with either term, is easily detected by reducing the propositions to plain and clear predication; as (for example) if any man should argue thus, _The hand toucheth the pen_, _The pen toucheth the paper_, Therefore, _The hand toucheth the paper_; the fallacy will easily appear by reducing it, thus: _The hand, is, touching the pen_, _The pen, is, touching the paper_, Therefore, _The hand, is, touching the paper_; where there are manifestly these four terms, _the hand_, _touching the pen_, _the pen_, and _touching the the paper_. But the danger of being deceived by sophisms of this kind, does not seem to be so great, as that I need insist longer upon them. [Sidenote: Of the fault which consists in equivocation.] 12. And though there may be fallacy in equivocal terms, yet in those that be manifestly such, there is none at all; nor in metaphors, for they profess the transferring of names from one thing to another. Nevertheless, sometimes equivocals (and those not very obscure) may deceive; as in this argumentation:--_It belongs to metaphysics to treat of principles; but the first principle of all, is, that the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time; and therefore it belongs to metaphysics to treat whether the same thing may both exist and not exist at the same time_; where the fallacy lies in the equivocation of the word principle; for whereas Aristotle in the beginning of his _Metaphysics_, says, that _the treating of principles belongs to primary science_, he understands by principles, causes of things, and certain existences which he calls primary; but where he says _a primary proposition is a principle_, by principle, there, he means the beginning and cause of knowledge, that is, the understanding of words, which, if any man want, he is incapable of learning. [Sidenote: Sophistical captions are oftener faulty in the matter than in the form of syllogisms.]