The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 02 (of 11)Hobbes, Thomas
Philosophy
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 02 (of 11)
Hobbes, Thomas
Philosophy, English -- 17th century
7. Among so many dangers therefore, as the natural lusts of men do
daily threaten each other withal, to have a care of one’s self is so
far from being a matter scornfully to be looked upon, that one has
neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every man is
desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but
chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he
doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a
stone moves downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor
reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a
man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and
the members thereof from death and sorrows. But that which is not
contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly,
and with right. Neither by the word _right_ is anything else
signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his
natural faculties according to right reason. Therefore the first
foundation of natural right is this, that _every man as much as in
him lies endeavour to protect his life and members_.
[Sidenote: A right to the end gives also a right to the means.]
8. But because it is in vain for a man to have a right to the end,
if the right to the necessary means be denied him, it follows, that
since every man hath a right to preserve himself, he must also be
allowed a right _to use all the means, and do all the actions,
without which he cannot preserve himself_.
[Sidenote: By the right of nature, every man is judge of the means
which tend to his preservation.]
9. Now whether the means which he is about to use, and the action he
is performing, be necessary to the preservation of his life and
members or not, he himself, by the right of nature, must be judge.
For if it be contrary to right reason that I should judge of mine
own peril, say, that another man is judge. Why now, because he
judgeth of what concerns me, by the same reason, because we are
equal by nature, will I judge also of things which do belong to him.
Therefore it agrees with right reason, that is, it is the right of
nature that I judge of his opinion, that is, whether it conduce to
my preservation or not.
[Sidenote: By right of nature, all men have equal right to all
things.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account