9. As colour is not inherent in the object, but an effect thereof upon us, caused by such motion in the object, as hath been described: so neither is _sound_ in the thing we hear, but in ourselves. One manifest sign thereof is, that as a man may _see_, so also he may _hear double_ or _treble_, by multiplication of _echoes_, which echoes are sounds as well as the original; and _not_ being in one and the _same place_, cannot be _inherent_ in the body that maketh them. Nothing can make any thing which is not in itself: the _clapper_ hath no _sound_ in it, but _motion_, and maketh motion in the internal parts of the bell; so the _bell_ hath motion, and not sound, that imparteth _motion_ to the _air_; and the _air_ hath motion, but not sound; the _air_ imparteth motion by the _ear_ and _nerve_ unto the _brain_; and the brain hath motion but not sound; from the _brain_, it reboundeth back into the nerves _outward_, and thence it becometh an _apparition without_, which we call _sound_. And to proceed to the _rest_ of the _senses_, it is apparent enough, that the _smell_ and _taste_ of the _same thing_, are _not_ the _same_ to _every man_; and therefore are not in the thing _smelt_ or _tasted_, but in the men. So likewise the _heat_ we feel from the fire is manifestly in _us_, and is quite _different_ from the heat which is in the _fire_: for _our_ heat is _pleasure_ or _pain_, according as it is _great_ or _moderate_; but in the _coal_ there is no such thing. By this the fourth and last proposition is proved, _viz._ that as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from _other_ senses, the subject of their inherence is not in the object, but in the sentient. [Sidenote: The main deception of sense.] 10. And from hence also it followeth, that _whatsoever accidents_ or qualities our senses make us think there be in the _world_, they be _not_ there, but are _seeming_ and _apparitions_ only: the things that really _are_ in the world without us, are those _motions_ by which these seemings are caused. And this is the _great deception of sense_, which also is to be by sense _corrected_: for as sense telleth me, when I see _directly_, that the colour seemeth to _be_ in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by _reflection_, that colour is not in the object. ------- CHAPTER III. 1. Imagination defined. 2. Sleep and dreams defined. 3. Causes of dreams. 4. Fiction defined. 5. Phantasms defined. 6. Remembrance defined. 7. Wherein remembrance consisteth. 8. Why in a dream a man never thinks he dreams. 9. Why few things seem strange in dreams. 10. That a dream may be taken for reality and vision. [Sidenote: Imagination defined.]