The _proem_ is the beginning of an oration, and, as it were, the preparing of the way before one enter into it. In some kinds of orations it resembles the _prelude_ of _musicians_, who first play what they list, and afterwards the tune they intended. In other kinds it resembles the _prologue_ of a _play_, that contains the argument. Proems of the first sort, are most proper for _demonstrative_ orations; in which a man is free to foretell, or not, what points he will insist upon. And for the most part it is better not; because when a man has not obliged himself to a certain matter, _digression_ will seem _variety_; but if he have engaged himself, _variety_ will be accounted _digression_. In _demonstratives_, the matter of the _proem_ consisteth in the _praise_ or _dispraise_ of some _law_ or _custom_, or in _exhortation_ or _dehortation_, or in something that serves to incline the hearer to the purpose. Proems of the second kind are most proper for _judicial_ orations. For as the _prologue_ in a _dramatic_, and the _exordium_ in an _epic_ poem, setteth forth in few words the argument of the poem; so in a _judicial oration_, the orator ought to exhibit a model of his oration, that the mind of the hearer may not be suspended, and for want of foresight err or wander. Whatsoever else belongs to a _proem_, is drawn from one of these four: from the _speaker_, from the _adversary_, from the _hearer_, or from the _matter_. From the _speaker_ and _adversary_, are drawn into proems such criminations and purgations as belong not to the cause. To the _defendant_, it is necessary in the proem to answer to the accusations of his _adversary_; that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his oration. But to the _plaintiff_, it is better to cast his criminations all into the _epilogue_; that the judge may the more easily remember them. From the _hearer_ and from the _matter_, are drawn into the proem such things as serve to make the _hearer_ favourable or angry, attentive or not attentive, as need shall require. And _hearers_ use to be attentive to _persons_ that are reputed _good_; to _things_ that are of _great consequence_, or that _concern themselves_, or that are _strange_, or that _delight_. But to make the _hearer_ attentive, is not the part of the _proem_ only, but of any other part of the oration, and rather of any other part than of the proem. For the _hearer_ is everywhere more remiss than in the beginning. And therefore wheresoever there is need, the orator must make appear both the _probity_ of his own _person_, and that the _matter_ in hand is of _great consequence_; or that it concerns the _hearer_, or that it is _new_, or that it is _delightful_. He that will have the hearer attentive to _him_, but not to the _cause_, must on the other side make it seem that the _matter_ is a _trifle_ without relation to the _hearer_, _common_ and _tedious_.