The care of the health, of the fortune, of the rank and reputation of
the individual, the objects upon which his comfort and happiness in
this life are supposed principally to depend, is considered as the
proper business of that virtue which is commonly called Prudence.
We suffer more, it has already been observed, when we fall from a
better to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy when we rise from a
worse to a better. Security, therefore, is the first and the principal
object of prudence. It is averse to expose our health, our fortune,
our rank, or reputation, to any sort of hazard. It is rather cautious
than enterprising, and more anxious to preserve the advantages which
we already possess, than forward to prompt us to the acquisition of
still greater advantages. The methods of improving our fortune, which
it principally recommends to us, are those which expose to no loss or
hazard; real knowledge and skill in our trade or profession, assiduity
and industry in the exercise of it, frugality, and even some degree of
parsimony, in all our expenses.
The prudent man always studies seriously and earnestly to understand
whatever he professes to understand, and not merely to persuade other
people that he understands it; and though his talents may not always
be very brilliant, they are always perfectly genuine. He neither
endeavours to impose upon you by the cunning devices of an artful
impostor, nor by the arrogant airs of an assuming pedant, nor by the
confident assertions of a superficial and impudent pretender. He is
not ostentatious even of the abilities which he really possesses. His
conversation is simple and modest, and he is averse to all the
quackish arts by which other people so frequently thrust themselves
into public notice and reputation. For reputation in his profession he
is naturally disposed to rely a good deal upon the solidity of his
knowledge and abilities; and he does not always think of cultivating
the favour of those little clubs and cabals, who, in the superior arts
and sciences, so often erect themselves into the supreme judges of
merit; and who make it their business to celebrate the talents and
virtues of one another, and to decry whatever can come into
competition with them. If he ever connects himself with any society of
this kind, it is merely in self-defence, not with a view to impose
upon the public, but to {189} hinder the public from being imposed
upon, to his disadvantage, by the clamours, the whispers, or the
intrigues, either of that particular society, or of some other of the
same kind.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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