To these mixed squares also, the word or sound to “extend” may be given. The men then, without regard to regular places, extend away to the right and left from each square, and double into files. When the ground is nearly occupied, the officer in command fixes on a point of direction, to which the whole conform. In the event of infantry skirmishers pressing forward to harass a square, or of cavalry endeavouring to prevent its movements by hovering near without charging, one or two ranks from the rear face may, by order, move briskly round by the right and left—double into files—cover the front at a short distance, and rush round again to their places whenever there appears a necessity for the square itself to fire. In drill in general, and in that of light infantry in particular, instructors confine themselves by far too closely to mere formal directions, to the neglect of pithy practical explanations. In nothing is this last addition more required than in reference to charges of cavalry. A column of horsemen, coming rapidly on with all its denseness, its height, its dust, its shouts, and its clangour, appears to the untrained mind as altogether irresistible. But appearances are not in themselves realities—let cavalry to the utmost stretch of mortal might,— “Come as the winds come when forests are rended;” And “come as the waves come when navies are stranded;” one thing only will be required to enable squares of infantry, like deep-rooted rocks, to disperse these wild winds and waves, right and left, in dust, froth, and confusion—_a well impressed knowledge of their own strength_; accompanied as a natural consequence, by a deliberate employment of that, _when properly used_, most destructive weapon, the musket.[15] Nor can more blame attach to cavalry for such results, than would apply to infantry for failing, in clear day-light, before well-barricadoed buildings or well-scarped redoubts. Neither in similar cases owe success, when they get it, to their own conduct or efficiency, but to the needless panic of their enemy. Such conclusions as to the relative strength of cavalry, are established by a string of facts more or less evident, stretching from Ilium, through Pharsalia, to Waterloo; and every fact is worth a thousand opposing ingenious speculations. VIII. Contending without a reserve is desperate risk in struggles of all kinds, civil and military. In such predicaments, if fortune frown, well nigh all is lost. In skirmishes, reserves, including in the first place supports, are not only of great importance as rallying points, in extraordinary cases of misfortune, but also as necessary aids to the ordinary movements of the extended line.