The true summit of perfection in skirmishing is, _the preservation of order in disorder_ and _of system in confusion_; for the circumstances which accompany skirmishes of necessity produce, almost always, more or less mixture, inversion, and general irregularity. In hot contests over large extents of intricate ground, men of different companies regiments, brigades, and even divisions, mingle with each other. Soldiers should therefore be drilled, _not indeed to fall into such irregularities on principle, but to be ready for them in practice_. They should be made at times to skirmish in inverted companies, mixed companies, and mixed regiments—to form good skirmishing lines out of confused masses—to concentrate from similar mixed bodies into squares to resist cavalry, or into lines or columns for the purposes of charging or defending streets of villages, or other defiles—to extend again rapidly, and to perform every necessary evolution as if no mixture or irregularity had occurred. _Such movements, when inculcated as necessary exceptions to good order, do not unfit soldiers for more regular manœuvres; but, by the contrast, increase order and intelligence in them._ Soldiers who have not been drilled on this principle, or who have not acquired it by experience, are, when extended under fire, continually liable to be transformed into unmanageable mobs. Skirmishers who understand it, will always show a formidable front, be ready for every changing event, and, under the worst possible circumstances, act together in the mighty energy of mutual confidence. Unreflecting mechanical precision is at direct variance with such practice, active intelligence and a wise well-defined general system are its component elements. Active intelligence, therefore, in every point of view, is invaluable to the skirmisher; and the attention of all drill superintendents and instructors should be unremittingly directed to stamp it on his mind and to mix it with his practice. II. The soldier at close order always has, or should have, a large mark for his fire. Nothing can be more unsteady or unsoldierlike than for a closed body to pour a volley upon mere skirmishers: from troops concentrated, no object but an opposing mass or line within 200 yards should provoke a single shot.[4] The skirmisher has not this advantage, his mark is generally small and often indistinct; besides which, the temptation to careless aim is much greater to him, who fires away sixty or one hundred and twenty rounds over hedge and ditch without intermission, than to the battalion soldier, who seldom expends more than twenty at any one time. Hence the peculiar necessity for practising light troops to cool steady aim and accurate firing.