The ethics of Hercules : $b A study of man's body as the sole determinant of ethical valuesGivler, Robert Chenault
Philosophy
The ethics of Hercules : $b A study of man's body as the sole determinant of ethical values
Givler, Robert Chenault
Ethics; Psychophysiology
While we do not claim that all cases of meaning involve such
wide-spread and imperative bodily disturbances as those which occur
in connection with tragic or erotic situations, it is nevertheless
a valid inference that words which stimulate us to no activity
whatsoever mean nothing to us. Certain it is, at least, that the
more meaningful or significant any word is, the more does it stir up
latent tendencies to action throughout our whole organism. Political
and religious slogans are telling examples of this. “Great is Diana
of the Ephesians!” “Remember the Maine!” and “For God, for Country,
and for Yale!” have been for some persons phrases of the maximal
philosophic content. Moreover, the same word may arouse different
meanings (or action-patterns) in different people, depending not only
on how the word is spoken, but also on the mood of the auditor. It is
a matter of common observation that the shout of “Fire!” calls forth
by no means the same responses from an insured landlord as it evokes
from an uninsured tenant, while the mention of _water_ will stimulate
one sort of reflex action in a thirsty man, and quite another sort in
a man who has just been rescued from drowning.
It is plain, then, that if physiological science has achieved the
least light upon the problems of psychology, the meaning which any
word or phrase possesses is not something that the sound of the word
or its written symbol is endowed with, or something that filters
through from any Platonic realm of ideas, but the meaning of any word
is given to it by the person who speaks or hears it. Moreover, this
endowment of meaning is implicit in the arousal of action tendencies
at the time when the word is spoken or heard. In the example recently
cited, the word “fire” had a different meaning for the insured
landlord from what it had for the uninsured tenant because the habits
of precaution which the former had acquired established a different
motor attitude toward fire than did the procrastination of the
latter. Consequently, the shouting and the conflagration were stimuli
in the presence of which the landlord could be calm, while the tenant
could not.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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