Any picture of the human race that one may draw furnishes evidence of the cogency of this definition. The child calls candy “good,” not because he knows that sugar is muscle food, but simply because he craves it, and sucks it in his mouth with avidity. This mode of speech he got long ago from his parents. His wanting the candy makes it “good” to him when he gets it, because the candy is a stimulus that evokes a response he was ready to make. The boy of ten wants a top that will spin like those which the other boys have, and he calls his a “good” top, when it satisfies the action-pattern which he has been developing. The rough youth of seventeen gives his bullying chum a “good” punch in the eye, by which he again means that the action-tendency he was covertly developing toward him has been provided a chance to expand into a full excitation. The college man of twenty-two calls a dance tune a “good” one, when, by its rhythmic effects it induces him to caper and relax, and satisfy his semi-sexual tendencies in public. And the old man of sixty-five often speaks of his wife as a “good” woman, because she has always had his dinner ready for him piping hot when, upon coming home, his whole alimentary system was keyed up to perform elaborate acts of chewing and swallowing. These and countless other cases, taken from every hour of the day and night, fully support the mechanistic interpretation which we have just given. But mark, that no question is in place here as to whether all such persons _ought_ to use the word “good” in such connections. The fact that they _do_ use it is, for the present, the only essential item to be considered in an empirical science of human conduct.