6. As deduced from Class F. Moral “rights” are all those unsecured claims and inexactly specified interests whose only protection is the approval and disapproval of the community, reinforced at times by an appeal to a super-human protagonist. A comparison between the motor-attitudes implied by Class E and Class F reveals several important differences. Juristic thinking, which we may for convenience characterize as the attitude implied by Class E, is on the whole logically coherent; moralistic thinking, on the contrary, commits every known logical fallacy. Again, juristic thinking is content to regard human problems capable of solution at the hands of human beings, and to consider that the verdicts of unruffled men and of men expert in their lines is final; while moralistic thinking is ever prone to employ methods which, on account of their provincialism and importunity, do not stand analysis at the hands of unbiased investigators. Finally, the “higher judge” which moralists assert stands behind the claims they make, is simply a misinterpretation of the meaning of long unrelieved tensions which have accumulated in their skeletal muscles. For while we do not declare that all claims unsecured by law are ethically invalid, we do nevertheless assert that the typical moralist’s attitude toward all such unsecured claims is not one that is suited to bridge the gap between our liquid matter and its good. Nevertheless, we may say without equivocation that behind every declaration of moral rights there is an anxiety lest some dependable good be lost, and this motor attitude we conceive to be the greatest common divisor of all the significations included under Class F. 7. As deduced from Class G. Although this class resembles the preceding one in that it refers to customs whose maintenance depends upon the approval and disapproval of the group, Class G lacks all of the fiercely Stoical and Puritanical elements found in Class F, just as it lacks the logical rigor pertaining to Class E. The action-patterns implied by this present class are rather those of a courteous gentleman, who persuades whenever he can by a gesture, but who does not try twice to persuade those who will not yield to that kind of a suggestion. 8. As deduced from Class H. Since “right” here signifies that which is convenient, desirable, favorable, etc., the action-patterns which it implies are practically identical with those of the first three classes of “good.” Certainly every example previously cited under this class points to an outgoing reaction. 9. As deduced from Class I. The adverbial use of our concept here implies merely a gesture of positive emphasis that may be added to any other action-pattern.