To illustrate in sequence: the anatomical measurements of _Pithecanthropus erectus_ would be knowledge of the first order. A theory based on these measurements which placed him in a certain group of related organisms would be knowledge of the second order. A statement about the value or the implications of the theory of this placement would be knowledge of the third order; it would be the judgment of a scientific theory from a dialectical position. It is at once apparent that the Tennessee “anti-evolution” law was a statement of the third class. That is to say, it was neither a collection of scientific facts, nor a statement about those facts (_i.e._, a theory or a generalization); it was a statement about a statement (the scientists’ statement) purporting to be based on those facts. It was, to use Adler’s phrase, a philosophical opinion, though expressed in the language of law. Now since the body of philosophical opinion is on a level which surmounts the partial universe of science, how is it possible for the latter ever to refute the former? In short, is there any number of facts, together with generalizations based on facts, which would be sufficient to overcome a dialectical position? Throughout the trial the defense tended to take the view that science could carry the day just by being scientific. But in doing this, one assumes that there are no points outside the empirical realm from which one can form judgments about science. Science, by this conception, must contain not only its facts, but also the means of its own evaluation, so that the statements about the statements of science are science too. The published record of the trial runs to approximately three hundred pages, and it would obviously be difficult to present a digest of all that was said. But through a carefully selected series of excerpts, it may be possible to show how blows were traded back and forth from the two positions. The following passages, though not continuous, afford the clearest picture of the dialectical-rhetorical conflict which underlay the entire trial. THE COURT (_in charging the grand jury_) You will bear in mind that in this investigation you are not interested to inquire into the policy of this legislation.[25] THE DEFENSE _Mr. Darrow_: I don’t suppose the court has considered the question of competency of evidence. My associates and myself have fairly definite ideas as to it, but I don’t know how the counsel on the other side feel about it. I think that scientists are competent evidence—or competent witnesses here, to explain what evolution is, and that they are competent on both sides. THE PROSECUTION