The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
Which of the two groups of powers sincerely worked for peace and which
obstructed those efforts?
In reaching its conclusion our imaginary Court would pay little
attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an
individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art
thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be
betrayed by a Judas-kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of
diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.
No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending
that his nation wished nothing but peace, and invoking divine aid for
its murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a
noted occasion, when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of "honor," it
might be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the
question.
The writer will so far anticipate the conclusions, which he thinks
these records indisputably show, as to suggest the respective
attitudes of the different groups of diplomats and statesmen as
revealed by these papers. If the reader will realize fully the policy
which from the first animated Germany and Austria, then the documents
hereinafter quoted will acquire new significance.
Germany and Austria had determined to impose their will upon Servia,
even though it involved a European war. From the outset they clearly
recognized such a possibility and were willing to accept the
responsibility.
The object to be gained was something more than a neutralization of
the pro-Slav propaganda. It was to subject Servia to such severe
punitive measures that thereafter her independence of will and moral
sovereignty would be largely impaired, if not altogether destroyed.
To do this it was not enough to have Servia take measures to prevent
pro-Slav agitation within her borders. Austria neither wanted nor
expected the acceptance of her impossible ultimatum.
It planned to submit such an ultimatum as Servia could not possibly
accept and, to make this result doubly sure, it was thought desirable
to give not only Servia but Europe the minimum time to take any
preventive measures. Giving to Servia only forty-eight hours within
which to reach a decision and to Europe barely twenty-four hours to
protect the peace of the world, it was thought that Servia would do
one of two things, either of which would be of incalculable importance
to Germany and Austria.
If Servia accepted the ultimatum for lack of time to consider it, then
its self-respect was hopelessly compromised and its independence
largely destroyed. Thenceforth she would be, at least morally, a mere
vassal of Austria.
If, however, Servia declined to accept the ultimatum, then war would
immediately begin and Servia would be, as was thought, speedily
subjected to punitive measures of such a drastic character that the
same result would be attained.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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