On the following day the German Ambassador again called at the French Foreign Office and protested against an article, which had appeared in a Paris newspaper and which had characterized his communication of the preceding day as the "German menace." The German Ambassador again gave an unequivocal assurance that there was no agreement between Austria and Germany over the Austrian note, _of which the German Government was ignorant_, although the German Government had subsequently approved it on receiving communication of it _at the same time as the other Powers_.[54] [Footnote 54: _Ibid._, No. 36.] The hardihood of this statement, in view of the fact that on the preceding day, simultaneously with the service of the ultimatum, the threatening demand had been delivered by Germany to the leading European chancelleries that the quarrel between Austria and Servia must be localized, is apparent. Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, then denied that his suggestion of "incalculable consequences," if the dispute were not localized, was a "menace." This statement, repeated by German diplomats in other capitals, approaches the ludicrous. The first military power of Europe formally advises other nations that unless they waive their legitimate claims and interests, "incalculable consequences" will follow, and it is gravely suggested that this is not a "menace." On the following day Baron von Schoen made two visits at the French Foreign Office and assured the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Germany _was on the side of France in the ardent desire for the maintenance of peace_, and she earnestly hoped that France would use her influence in a soothing manner in St. Petersburg. I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had committed no act throwing doubt upon her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking for a peaceful solution of the struggle. It therefore appeared to me that in counterpart Germany should act in Vienna, _where the efficacy of her action was sure_, with a view to avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of Servia. The Ambassador having pointed out to me that that was irreconcilable with the position adopted by Germany, "that the question only concerned Austria and Servia," I said to him that mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg might be made by the four Powers who were less directly interested in the matter. Baron von Schoen then sheltered himself behind his lack of instructions on this point, and I told him that in these circumstances I did not feel able to act in St. Petersburg alone. Our conversation concluded with the renewed assurance by the Ambassador as to the peaceful intentions of Germany, who, he declared, was with France on this point.[55] [Footnote 55: French _Yellow Book_, No. 56.]