If Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the great Powers examine _the reparation which Servia could accord to the Government of Austria-Hungary without injury to her rights as a sovereign State_ and to her independence--Russia undertakes to maintain her expectant attitude. It will be noted that this formula implied that Servia owed some reparation to Austria, and it did not bind Austria to accept the judgment of the Powers as to the character of such reparation. It simply conceded to the Powers the opportunity to "examine"--not the original controversy between Austria and Servia--but what reparation could be made without a compromise of sovereignty and independence. Austria did not bind itself to do anything except to stay the advance of her army into Servia, while Russia agreed to desist from further preparations or mobilization. Could the offer have been more liberal? In face of this assurance, how can the Kaiser or Germany reasonably contend that it was the mobilization of the Russian army which precipitated the war. In the meantime Sir Edward Grey was working tirelessly to suggest some peace formula, upon which the Powers could agree. His suggestions for a conference of the four leading Powers of Europe, other than Russia and Austria, had been negatived by Germany on the frivolous pretext that such a conference was "too formal a method," quite ignoring the fact that its very formality would have necessarily given a "cooling time" to the would-be belligerents. Thereupon Sir Edward Grey urged that, _the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia_. France agreed. Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable_. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible _if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace_.[70] [Footnote 70: English _White Paper_, No. 84.] Later in the day Sir Edward again repeated his suggestion to the German Ambassador in London and urged that Germany should,